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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Engle v. Davenport27 illustrates the effect of the Johnson case.
The action was first brought in a state court and on appeal " ' the Supreme Court of California held that the lower court had no jurisdiction.
The decision in the Johnson case was handed down the next month,
and this action was again brought in the state court and judgment
recovered for the plaintiff. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court
of the state.29 The result of this latest development is clear, and the
interpretation of the act now seems to be definitely settled. It may
be said, therefore, that Section 33 of the Jones Act provides that the
plaintiff may bring his action thereunder in a state court, if he so
elects, regardless of the fact that there is a diversity of citizenship, and
the defendant may not remove the cause to the federal court.30 The
same is true if the plaintiff elects to bring his action in the federal
court, both he and the defendant being residents of the same state."
Clifford M. Langhorne.
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CARRIERS-STUEET

RAILWAYS-NEGLIGENCE

AN7D CONTRIlBUTORY NEGI.IGENCE-

who was familiar with the location of the tracks
and loading platform at the point where the accident occurred, stood waiting
VIOLATION OF ORDINANE.-A,

for a street car in such a position that she was struck and killed by the overhanging side of defendant's passing interurban car. Held. (1) The pedestrian is charged with notice of the extent of the vehicle's overhang; failure to

warn the pedestrian of the overhang does not constitute negligence; and the
train crew may presume that the person will exercise ordinary prudence and

avoid the velucle; (2) the fact that the car was operated at a rate of speed in
excess of that permitted by a city ordinance does not charge the defendant
with negligence unless the speed was the proximate cause of the injury Beach
v. Pacfic Northwest Traction Co., 35 Wash. Dec. 184, 237 Pac. 737 (July,
1925).
(1) Undisputed evidence showed that the illuminated car was visible for
three hundred yards down a straight track, and that a warning gong was
sonably certain that the provision is not intended to affect the general jurisdiction of the District Courts as defined in section 24, but only to prescribe the

venue for actions brought under the new act of which it is a part."

-288 Pac. 710 (Aug. -05,1924).
1924 A. M. C. 758 (Mar. 25, 1924).
The court said, after discussing the Johnson v. Panana R. case: "It follows that if this provision merely defines the 'venue' of an action, the theory
that such provision conferred 'jurisdiction' upon a particular court is no longer

tenable; and, in the absence of any other provision purporting to divest of
jurisdiction, those courts, both state and federal, which prior to the enactment
of the Merchant Marine Act had jurisdiction of such actions, such jurisdiction
may be presumed to continue."

'See: UllIch v. N. Y., N ITH.
H. R. R. Co., 193 Fed. 768 (1912) De
Atley v. Chesapeake 4- 0. By. Co., 201 Fed. 591 (1912) Jones v. Kansas City
Southern Ry. Co., 137 La. 178, 68 So. 401 (1915) Pankey v. Atchison, T. "
S. F Ry. Co., 180 Mo. App. 185, 168 S. W 274 (191-1).
" See: Panama R. Case, supra.
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sounded as it approached the locus m quo. Therefore the primary question
that arises is whether or not there is an affirmative duty on the persons operating a street railway to affirmatively warn persons not passengers of the dangers
arising out of the overhanging sides and ends of their vehicles. Citing with
approval the cases of Gannaway v. Puget Sound Traction, Light ' Power Co.,
77 Wash. 655, 136 Pac. 967 (1914) and Leftbrtdge v. Seattle, 130 Wash. 541,
228 Pac. 302 (1924), the court said that there was no such duty. The case at
bar goes slightly farther than either of the cases cited in that it holds that the
persons in charge of the vehicle may presume that the pedestrian will exercise
ordinary prudence and step out of the way. The cases differ slightly on their
facts in that the accidents in the two earlier cases were caused by the projecting
rear ends of street cars as they rounded corners, while in the case at bar the
deceased was struck by the overhanging side of a car passing on a straight
track. The decision is a progressive one, and is supported by the weight of
authority.
( 2) At the time of the injury the car was approaching at an. estimated
speed of thirty miles an hour, in violation of a city ordinance. Following the
rule in Burlie v. Stephens, 113 Wash. 182, 193 Pac. 684 (1920), the court held
that where the violation of the ordinance is not the proximate cause of the
injury, there is no imputation of negligence arising from the bare violation of
the ordinance.
W S. T.
Co.%xu3U.--T- PROPERTY-RIGHT OF HUSAND TO MAXE GIFT OF CommrNTY"
PERSO ALJPROPERTY WITHOUT JOINING VrI.-The son borrowed $3,000 from
the bank, his father joining as accommodation maker. Upon default, demand
was made upon the father, who offered, as part payment, a certificate of
deposit issued by the bank to him for $1,000. The bank refused to accept it
as part payment, but allowed it to be placed as collateral while attempts would
be made to collect the note. Tins was unsuccessful. The father died while the
certificate was still in the bank, and his estate brought suit against the bank
for the certificate, claiming that the debt of the son and the father was not a
community debt, and that the wife not being a party to the matter was entitled
to her community share in the certificate.

Held: The transaction, including the signing of the note by the husband
and the giving of the security was for the benefit of a son of both members of
the community in which each were equally interested. When the husband used
the community personal property for this purpose, even though the wife is not
joined, he will be held to be acting as statutory agent of the community.
Stevens v. Naches State Bank, 36 Wash. Dec. 119, 238 Pac. 918 (1925).
The husband, under the statute, has the control and right of disposition
of community personal property, and must exercise that control for and on
behalf of the community only. Schramm v. 9teele, 97 Wash. 309, 166 Pac. 634
(1917).
A disposition of community property must be in the interest of the com'munity, and a gift is therefore void. Parker v. Parker 191 Wash. 24, 207
Pac. 1062 (1922).
But according to the reported case, if a father assists a child of the
spouses with community personal property, he will be deemed to have aided
the community and therefore acting as statutory agent for the community.
W B. W
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CONTRACT GIVING POWER To DEFENDANT TO "DETERCERTAIN - FAcTs WouLD BE ENTFORCE.-Defendant signed
a grower's contract to deliver his fruit crop to plaintiff, a co-operative association, for marketing purposes. The contract provided that it should be inoperative unless 4,200 carloads of apples were signed up before March 1, 1921. The
contract further provided that "the tonnage shall be conclusively ascertained
by the association by a tabulation of the tonnage estimated in each of the
contracts signed." The board of directors of the association, acting in good
faith, determined that the required tonnage had been obtained, basing its
determination upon figures furnished by the officers of the association. The
figures furmshed by the officers were dishonest and fraudulent. Held. That
even though the directors acted fairly and honestly, if it appeared that the
information upon which they acted was unfair and dishonest, their determination would not be held conclusive against defendants. TVenatchee Distrt (oOperative Associeaion v. M ohler 35 Wash. Dec. 96, 237 Pac. 300 (1925).
CONTRACTS-WHETHER

XINE CONCLUSIVELY"

This case is not, at first blush, in accord with the case of WVashington
Wheat Growers' Association v. Leifer 132 Wash. 602, 232 Pac. 339 (1925),
when a board of directors was allowed to determine, conclusively certain facts,
under a contract similar to the one in Wenatchee District Co-Operative Association v. Mohler. But the cases are easy to reconcile since the element of
fraud appears only in the case of Venatchee District Co-operative Assoriation
v. Mohler and forms a very distinct line between the two cases.
The latter case is well considered, and apparently in harmony with the
weight of authority
C. P
CONTRACTS-WHETHER FILLING iN A3IOUNT OF BLANK IN A CoNx'aAcr OF
WAS A MATERIAL
ALTERATioN.-Defendant Denbeigh owed the
plaintiff $2,217. The parties entered into a contract by which Denbeigh agreed
to pay the existing indebtedness during the term of the new contract and the
plaintiff agreed to supply Denbeigh with certain merchandise. A contract of
guaranty was signed by the other defendants by which they agreed to pay the
existing indebtedness and any future indebtedness. A blank was left for the
amount of the existing debt. After the defendants signed the guaranty, the
plaintiff, without defendant's knowledge or consent, filled the blank in, in the
sum of $2,217, which sum the defendants admitted on trial to be the correct
indebtedness. The defendants contend that such filling in was a material alteration releasing them from liability as guarantors. Held. That since the guarantors agreed to pay the existing indebtedness, the insertion of the correct
amount was not a material alteration. T R.
Vatkins Co. v. Denbeigh, 35
Wash. Dec. 338, 138 Pac. 13 (1925).
GUARANTY

The rule is well settled that any wilful, material alteration of a written
instrument made after its execution by one of the parties releases the noconsenting parties from any obligations under the instrument. Cline v. Goodale.
33 Ore. 406, 31 Pac. 956, 959 (1893) American Pub. Co. v. Fisher 10 Utah 147
37 Pac. 259 (1894)
1 AMvER. & ENG. ENcyc. OF LAW 502 Dunbar, C. J., in
Murray v. Peterson, 6 Wash. 418, 33 Pac. 969 (1893). The reason for the rule
is twofold: (1) because tampering with written instruments is contrary to
public policy (2) because the identity of the instrument is destroyed. 2 C. J
1176,7 1 R. C. L. 969.
The alteration must be material.

It must change the legal effect of the
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instrument so as to change the rights, obligations or relations of the parties.
Turner v. Biltagram, 2 Cal. 523, 4 (1852) Dunbar, C. J., in Murray v. Peterson, 6 Wash. 418, 33 Pac. 969 (1893) 7 L. R. A. 743. If the legal effect remains unchanged leaving the rights, obligations and relations of the parties as
originally regulated by the parties, the alterations or additions are not deemed
material. Humphry v. Crane, 5 Cal. 173 (1855) Kleeb v. Bard, 12 Wash. 140,
40 Pac. 733 (1895)
Young v. Borzone, 26 Wash. 4, 66 Pac. 135 (1901). Even
though the evidentiary value of the instrument may be enhanced, as long as
the legal effect of the instrument remains the same, it has been held that the
filling in of a blank is an immaterial alteration. Dr. Ward's Medical Co. v.
Wolleat, 199 N. W (Minn.) 738 (1924). Contra: Watkan's Medical Co. v.
Fornea, 135 Miss. 690, 100 So. 185 (1924). The addition merely makes the
instrument conform with itself and supplies nothing further than that which
would be implied without it. Sill v. Reese, 47 Cal. 347, 8 (1874) Dr. Ward's
Medical Co. v. Wolleat, 199 N. IV 738 (Minn.) (1924).
For cases contra see Watkn's Medical Co. v. Payne, 180 N. W (N. D.)
968; J R. Watkin's Medical Co. v. Miller 40 S. D. 505, 168 N. W 373 (1918)
(these cases are discussed in the case at bar).
The dissenting judge with his two concurring colleagues base their position on the ground that to permit an addition to the written instrument after
execution, is to open the door to fraud. In the case at bar, however, the defendants admitted that the amount inserted was correct. It would seem, then,
that since the legal effect of the instrument remains unchanged by the insertion
of the correct indebtedness owing, the decision in the instant case is sound.
C. H.
CRIMINAi. LAw-EVDE Ec-PrEsuiPv-O
OF OWNERSHIP FRo LiCEXsE.Appellant and another were jointly convicted of the crime of being a jointist.
State of Washington v. Jukich, 36 Wash. Dec. 1, 238 Pac.-(1925). The only
evidence introduced in re the appellant's participation in the crime was the
fact that a license to run a soft drink parlor at the place raided was issued
to him. Appellant rebutted this presumption of ownership by evidence showing that he had sold the establishment to someone else who applied to the city
council for a license five days before the raid. This evidence was not contradicted in any way. The Supreme Court held it was error for the trial
court to refuse a directed verdict of not guilty, maintaimng that the case
should never have gone to the jury. No evidence was introduced by the State
to show that the defendant was there "conducting and maintaining the place,"
and there was evidence to the contrary which was not denied. The principle
enunciated by the Supreme Court is--"a presumption (here the presumption
of ownership by the issuance of the license in appellant's name) is not evidence
of a fact but purely a conclusion." See also Scarpelli v. Wash. Water Power
Co., 63 Wash. 18, 114 Paec. 870 (1911), also Anning v. Rothschild
Co., 130
Wash. 932, M26Pac. 1013 (1924). In both the above cases the case of Peters v.
Lohr, 94 S.D. 605, 124 N. W 853 (1910), was quoted where the court in speaking of the effect and character of "presumption" says, "a presumption is not
evidence of anything and only relates to the rule of law as to which party shall
first go forward and produce evidence sustaining a matter in issue." For a
discussion of presumption see WiOxoRE o, EVIDENCE, §§2490 20491 and ELLioTr
o- EviDnEu
cE, §§91 and 23.
State of Washington v. Jukich. clearly follows the rule of presumptions

IFASHING TON LAJIF REVIEW
as stated in the case of Vernarelli v. Sweikert, 123 Wash. 694, 213 Pac. 482
(1923), which is to the effect that a presumption has probative value when
the testimony contradicting it is only that of an interested party. Then the
case should properly go to the jury. If the testimony contradicting the presumption is that of a disinterested witness then the court should grant a nonsuit in the event that the state or opposing party has no further evidence. In
the instant case (State v. Jukich) the Supreme Court decided that the appellant's witnesses, contradicting the presumption of ownership, were all disinterested and their testimony was unimpeaclied in any way, thus bringing
the case clearly within the general rule.
J. H.
EGLIGENCE-DuTY

OF

AiiUTriIc,

PROPERTY

OwNEa

To

KEEP

SIDEWALKS

lac.-A, the plaintiff, leaving a theatre operated by the
aefendants B and C, through a regular exit, leading to an alley alongside
the theatre, slipped upon the sidewalk immediately in front of the exit, by
reason of its being covered with snow and ice. The defendants had cleared
the sidewalk in front of the theatre, but had done nothing with that on the
alley side, the snow still being there as it had fallen the day before. Held.
There was no duty upon the defendants to remedy the unsafe condition of
the walk caused by the depositing of the snow thereon by the elements. Ainey
v. Rialto Amusement Co., 35 Wash. Dec. 4, 236 Pac. 801 (1925).
CLEAR Or Sxow AND

The holding in this case is in accord with the preceding Washington case
of Zellers v. Seattle Lodge No. 92, B. P 0. E., 94 Wash. 32, 161 Pac. 834
(1916), and City of Seattle v. Shorrock, 100 Wash. 234, 170 Pac. 590 (1918),
and with what is overwhelmingly the weight of authority "So far as defects
in it (the street, sidewalk, etc.) result wholly from the operations of nature,
the proprietor at whose front they exist is without responsibility for them."
City of Hartford v. Talcott, 48 Conn. 525, 40 Am. Rep. 189 (1881). In the
present case, the court quotes the rule as expressed in 13 R. C. L. 41a that
"In the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, the owner or occupant
of property owes no duty to pedestrians to keep the sidewalk in front of it
free from ice and snow coming thereon from natural causes or to guard against
the risk of accident by scattering ashes or using other like precautions, and
will not be liable in damages to persons injured by reason of his failure to do
so. Nor does a storekeeper owe any greater duty in this regard to customers
leaving his store than he does to the ordinary pedestrians."
It is equally indisputable that where the abutting owner has by his negligence created or increased the danger from snow or ice, he may be held liable.
The court cites City of Hartford v. Talcott, supra, McGrath v. MJ1sch,
29 R. 1. 49, 69 Atl. 8, 132 Am. St. 798 (1908) Dahlin v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 163,
77 N. E. 830, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 615 and note (1906) New Castle v. Kurtz,
010 Pa. St. 183, 105 Am. St. 798, 69 L. R. A. 488, 59 Atl. 989, 1 A. & E. Ann.
Cas. 934 and note (1904)
Hanley v. Fireproof Bldg. Co., 107 Neb. 544, 186
N. W 534, 24 A. L. R. 382 and note (1922).
Among the veritable host of other citations on this point are: Van Dyke v.
-City of Cincinnati,et al., 1 Disney 532 (1857) Kirby v. Boylston Market Assoc.,
14 Gray 249 (1859)
Flynn v. Canton Co. of Baltimore, 40 Md. 312 (1874)
Stenbeck v. John Hauck Brewing Co., 7 Ohio App. 18 (1916) Sneeson v.
Kupfer, 21 R. I. 560, 4a Atl. 579 (1900) Sanborn v. MeKeagney, 229 Mass.
:300, 118 N. E. 263 (1918)
City of Seattle v. Shorrock, supra; Zellers v.
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Bs. P 0. E., supra; Hart v. Wright, 935 Mass. 943, 126 N. E. 383 (1920)
Boechler v. City of St. Paul, 149 Minn. 69 182 N. W 908 (1991) Tiffany v.
Russell v. Sincoe
F Vorenberg Co., 938 Mass. 183, 130 N. E. 193 (1921)
Realty Co., 293 Mo. 428, 940 S. W 147 (1922) Pickett v. Waldorf System,
941 Mass. 569, 136 N. E. 6- (1999).
H. S.
Nuis.xcE-Gnouxns roR I.iJu.cTro-LvxnLoan AND Tu:A-,',r.-Appellants leased storeroom to respondents "to be used as and for a meat market
and for the sale of meat and meat products." The lease contained a restrictive
clause against carrying on any dangerous, noxious or unlawful business therein
or a business tending to depreciate or injure the reputation or value of the
premises. Tenants above complained of noise and vibration from motor
driven refrigerating plant installed by respondents. Appellant sought to
enjoin its operation, on the ground that it was a violation of the restrictive
clause of the lease. Evidence showed that the plant was of a type in ordinary
use in such a business, was installed with knowledge or appellants, similar to
one operated by previons tenants, and that the plant was operated in a proper
manner. Held. That the lease of the premises for a particular use carried
with it a license to carry on such business by the ordinary methods and with
the usual appliances; that it was an implied covenant of the lease; that such
right was not affected by the restrictive clause as the exercise of such right
was not dangerous or injurious to the building; that the loss, if any, should
be on the lessor if, due to the construction of the building, more noise and
vibration resulted than was anticipated. Jurek v. Walton, 35 Wash. Dec. 46,
236 Pac. 805 (1925). The court distinguishes the case of Spokqne Stamp Works
v. R dpath, 48 Wash. 370, 93 Pac. 533 (1908), where machinery installed in
the storeroom of a hotel had not been contemplated and could not be inferred
from the lease and where there had been no designation of purpose in the
lease. The operation of the macninery in that instance prevented the use of
the hotel parlor and the letting of rooms.
The principal case is in accord with the apparent general rule stated in
Karl r. Jackson, 12 Ohio App. 477 (1920), i. e., "Provisions in the lease authorizing the carrying on of a certain business in the leased premises constitute a
license to carry on the stipulated business by the usual methods and with
ordinary care." "All doubts as to the construction of a restriction are to be
resolved in favor of natural rights and against the restriction." Dietrwh v.
Ezra Smith Co., 19 Oluo App. 943 (1990). In regard to the element of acqmescence brought out in the principal case, Mahoney Land Co. v. Cayuga Inv. Co.,
88 Wash. 599, 153 Pac. 308 (1915), is in point "After encouraging and
acquiescing in the erection of private garages the owner of a nearby apartment
house cannot restrain their operation as a nuisance although they proved a great
annoyance to its tenants where it was not claimed that the garages were used
in an unusually noisy or disorderly manner."
L. S.
SEEPAGE "WATES---RIGHiT TO AuM

E.TEo FLOW or STREAm-BEXEFICIAL

USE Or SrEAt.--Certain springs were located on appellant's land, the waters
of which flowed into a creek. Inthe irrigation season the flow of the springs
was increased by certain seepage waters surrounding reservoirs and ditches,
which seepage waters the lower court held to belong to the appellants. To
save the expense of mechamcally elevating the water for irrigation purposes,
the appellants had allowed the seepage water to flow into the creek and had
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then taken out an equal amount of water from a point higher up on the creek,
whence they could irrigate by gravitation. The trial court enjoined appellants
from taking the water from the point above, and limited their use to such
seepage waters as could be appropriated and put to beneficial use upon the
land only where the springs arose. Held. That, reversing the judgment below,
in the absence of injury to others appearing, appellants were entitled to take
an equivalent amount of water at a point further up the creek and also to
use such water on any lands belonging to them regardless of location of
springs. State v. Amercan Fruit Growers, 35 Wash. Dec. 86, 237 Pac. 498
(1925).
Seepage or percolating waters are "vagrant wandering drops, moving by
gravity, beneath the surface of the ground in any and every direction along the
line of least resistance." 27 R. C. L. 1168; City of Los Angeles v. Hunter 156
Cal. 603, 105 Pac. 755 (1909).
The question of ownership of such seepage waters was avoided in the case
at bar because not raised on appeal. In accordance with the unchallenged
ruling of the trial court, the seepage water was assumed to be the property
of the persons owning the land on which the springs were located. This
assumption is in accord with the English rule first announced in 1843, giving
an absolute right (proprietory) to seepage and percolating waters. Acton v.
Blundell, 12 Mess. and W 324 (1843). The English rule seems to have been
recognized in this state. Miller v. Wheeler 54 Wash. 429, 103 Pac. 641 Mason
v. Yearwood, 58 Wash. 276, 108 Pac. 608, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1158 (1910).
However, Washington has also recognized the so-called American or "reasonable use" rule (27 R. C. L. 1174), which allows the owner only the reaionable
and not the absolute use of percolating waters on the theory that adjoining
landowners have correlative rights to percolating water. Patrick v. Sinith, 75
Wash. 407, 134 Pac. 1076, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 740 (1913) Nielson v. Spooner
46 Wash. 14, 89 Pac. 155 (1907).
It does not appear that in the first Washington cases which apparently
state the English rule that the owner was making an unreasonable use of the
water- hence, they are not necessarily inconsistent with the reasonable use
doctrine.
Seepage water may be conveyed along any natural stream of this state
so long as the ordinary high water mark is not raised. Sec. 3 Water Code,
Laws of 1917, p. 447, Rerm. Comp. Stat. § 7353, Pierce's Code § 7205. Where
no one is prejudiced thereby, a change in point of diversion of a stream may
be made. Osborne v. Chase, 119 Wash. 476, 205 Pac. 844 (1923) Kidd v.
.Laird,15 Cal. 162 (1861). Since, under the decisions, a landowner is entitled
to the reasonable use of percolating waters, in the absence of prejudice to
another, he should be permitted to use the waters in a manner most beneficial
to himself. If to make such beneficial use, he allows the seepage water to
flow into and augment the stream, it would seem logical and just as the court
points out, to allow him to take out an equivalent amount of water at a point
further up the stream.
A. R.
STATUTE OF FiLtUDs-CoxTraACTS NOT To BE Pziroa.izo
1 WITHIN A YEAR.A contracted to deliver certain stock to B, when B had paid $3,000, $50 per
month from July, 1917 to July, 1922. B having completed his payments
seeks to enforce the contract. A denies the allegations of the complaint. On
the trial he objects to evidence of an oral promise, on the grounds that the
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contract was void by the Statute of Frauds, being by its terms not to be performed within a year. Held: The objection should be sustained. The statute,
Rem. Comp. Stat. § 5825, makes such contracts void, not voidable. The objection may be raised any time, since it goes to the question of whether or not
a cause of action is stated. The statute is not simply a sield of which the
defendant may avail himself only by pleading it. Hendry v. Bird, 35 Wash.
Dec. 99, 237 Pac. 317 (1925).
The court disposes of the many cases to the contrary, from other jurisdictions, by pointing out that they were decided under statutes which followed the original statute, 29 Car. II, c. 3 (1677 A. D.), winch says: "
no
action shall' be brought whereby
to charge any person upon a contract
not to be performed witlun a year, unless some note or memorandum thereof
shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged, or some other person thereunto by um lawfully authorized." Some of these cases were not
decided under just such statutory wording, but were profoundly influenced by
cases which had been decided under that form of words. Our statute says
such contracts are void, unless, etc.
It is often said under the older form of words, that the statute affects the
remedy, not the substantive law. Maddison v. Alderson, 8 App. Cas. 467, 488
(1883) Morris v. Baron, [1918] A. C. 1. It is also sometimes said to be in
the nature of a rule of evidence. Townsend v. Hargreaves, 118 Mass. 325
(1875), Bird v. Munroe, 22 Am. Rep. 571 (Me.) Lerout' v. Brown, 12 C. B.
801 (1852).
Our court, however, seems to take the view that our statute affects the
substance of the contract, for it says such contracts are a mere nullity.
This holding appears necessary to give effect to the plain words of the
statute, yet it raises some peculiar considerations.
It is usually held that a memorandum made by one party after the contract has been concluded, will operate to bind that party. This is logical
enough if the statute affects only the remedy. But in Washington where the
contract is absolutely void, a mere nullity, surely a subsequent memorandum
could not bind anyone, unless a new contract were made.
Another difficulty arises. Suppose X and Y enter into a contract in which
each party assumes obligations to be performed in the future. If there is
only a iiemorandum signed by X, then X cannot enforce the contract against
Y, because Y did not sign, and that makes it void, a nullity, as the court declares. It is submitted if it were Y instead of X seeking to enforce the
same contract, in the words of our court, speaking in another connection: "We
cannot conceive of such a thing as a contract that is void under the Statute
of Frauds, and yet can be the foundation of a legal obligatiorn arising out of
nothing else." It may be objected that the contract is not absolutely void, and
a nullity, but merely unenforceable aganist Y. However, it appears that
that is the direct opposite of the holding in the principal case.
It is the above line of reasomng which prompted the holding in Idaho
and Michigan, that the memorandum must be signed by both parties. Houser
v.Hobart, 22 Idaho 735, 127 Pac. 997, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 410 (1912), Kess v.
Finch, 25 Idaho 32, 135 Pac. 1165 (1913) Wilkinson v. Heavenrich, 58 Mich.
574, 26 N. W 139, 35 Am. St. Rep. 708 (1886) Telephone Co. v. Kadus, 14,0
Mich. 367, 103 N. W 814, 112 Am. St. Rep. 714 (1905), Adams v.Harrington,
154 Mich. 198, 117 N. W 551, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 919 (1908). It is significant
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that our court cites a Michigan case, Scott v. Bush, 26 Mich. 418 (1873), in
support of the proposition that the contract is a nullity under such a statute
as ours.

The vast weight of authority is that only the defendant in that particular action need have signed. This is perfectly understandable under the
older form of statute and under the theory that it was only the remedy and
not the substance which was affected. Though even then Lord Redesdale found
difficulty in enforcing a contract in which there was no mutuality of obligation.
Lawrensoa v. Butler 1 Sch. and Lef. 13. See also Chancellor Kent's dictum
in Clasonm v. Bailey, 14 Johns. 483 (1817). Allen, J. in Justice v. Lang, 59
N. Y 323 (1873), had difficulty finding any consideration for a valid contract
if only one person were bound. But the law was settled otherwise, and only
the defendant's signature was required. The case of Justice v. Lang, 42 N. Y
494 (1879), interpreted the new statute, which resembled our own, in the same
manner as the old, largely on the authority of cases decided under the old
statute. Crane v. Powell, 139 N. Y. 379, 34 N. E. 911 (1893), and Mathews v.
Mathews, 154 N. Y. 288, 48 N. E. 531 (1897), show from another angle that
New York regards the statute as affecting the remedy rather than the substance of the contract. They are directly opposed to the principal case.
In our own Reports the interesting case of Wright v. Grocery Co., 105
Wash. 383, 177 Pac. 818 (1919), holds that only the defendant need have
signed. The point is not discussed except to remark that the weight of authority so held, and then the court went on to say, "This seems to rest on the theory
that the statute is in the nature of a rule of evidence, necessitating written ii
place of parol proof." The principal case seems to recognize that the contract
is void in substance. This may weaken the holding in the Wright case to some
degree. There are two cases cited in the Wright case, Tingley v. Bellingham
Bay Co., a Wash. 644, 33 Pac. 1055 (1893) Anderson v. Wallace Lumber Co.,
-30 Wash. 147, 70 Pac. 247 (1902). But both of them concern contracts for the
future sale of land. Now our statutes do not require these to be in writing.
But the court does require it, probably on the grounds that that particular
clause of the statute 99 Car. II. c. 3, may be in force in Washington as part
of the common law. As was pointed out before, that statute affects only the
remedy. Hence those cases might be distinguished from those arising under
our statute, Rem. Comp. Stat. § 5825.
0. B. K.
UNFAIR
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A-%oTnEa CoPAN.-The plaintiff, AB Taxicab Company, had for
four years been operating a fleet of cabs, all painted in the same distinctive
manner, the color of yellow predominating. It had in the meantime, by extensive advertising and excellence of service, built up a considerable good-will.
Emphasizing the color scheme, they identified their cabs and business by the
names "Yellow Cab" and "Yellow Cab Company." With this situation existing,
the defendants, C, D and E, individual cab owners and drivers, repainted their
cabs, yellow being also the dominant color in their newly applied color scheme.
The similarity was sufficient to confuse prospective taxicab patrons, as proven
by a number of specific instances. Patrons, deceived by this similarity, hailed
and entered the defendants' cabs, believing them to be those of the plaintiff.
Moreover, the plaintiff company was unjustly accused of charging the higher
prices which were levied by the defendants. Held. Plaintiff entitled to an
injunction preventing the defendants from operating cars thus deceutivelv
oF
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painted. Seattle Taxicab Co. v. Oliver DeTarlais,35 Wash. Dec. 7, 236 Pac. 785
(1925).
The court here quoted and affirmed the rule as laid down in the case of
Pacific Coast Condensed Milk Co. v. Frye 4- Co., 85 Wash. 133, 147 Pac. 865
(1915), although the prior case was, on its facts, decided differently. The
court says in the Frye case: "Irrespective of technical trade-marks, courts
have long recognized the right of the first user of a distinctive dress of goods
to protection against use by atcther of a similar dress or name in unfair
competition. The basic principle of the doctrine of unfair competition, though
variously expressed, is exceedingly simple. It is just tis-no dealer or manufacturer has the right by any name, mark, sign, label, dress or other artifice,
to represent to the public that the goods sold by him are those manufactured
or produced by another, thus passing off his goods for those of such other to
the latter's injury." The rule condemns "what would be reasonably calculated
to deceive the common or usual purchaser of the given article when exercising
ordinary care."
Although there were certain differences which could be observed upon
examination, in the appearances of the rival cabs, yet they were not such as
would be noticed by the casual user. The court points out that "the majority
of the taxicab business is done at night when details and appearances of the
cab are not readily discernible," that "usually the passenger-to-be is in a
hurry and intent mainlv on reaching his destination promptly," and it says
"still more important, the incapacity of the ordinary person to observe or
consider details or make comparisons unless his attention thereto be definitely
invited, must also be remembered."
The court pays its respects to the general rule, recognized in the Frye
case, supra, that "primary colors as such may not be appropriated and monopolized," but stands upon the qualification that such primary colors shall not
be used in a manner so as to deceive. "Respondents might have freely used
yellow and black as fancy dictated, so long as they did not so use them as to
deceive those members of the public seeking to employ appellants (plaintiffs)
and cause their cabs to be engaged in place of those operated by appellant."
The Frye case, and the case of Vittuwct Co. v. Merline, 130 Wash. 483, 238 Pac.
20 (1924), are distinguishable, in that in neither of them was the similarity
deceptive.
2%r. Justice Parker dissents from the opinion of the rest of the court, insisting that "the use of yellow as a dominant color for a taxicab, or anything

else, is as much the common property of everybody as is black or any other
common color." And he says, "The respondents' motives in the use of this,
what I conceive to be a common right, is a question with which we have no

concern."

It might be noted that one of the defendants explained his fondness

for yellow with the statement that a yellow dog had once saved his life!
A question of pleading also arose in the case, by reason of the joinder of
the three individual cabmen, between whom no concert of action was alleged.
The complaint had originally contained allegations of damages and a prayer
for pecuniary relief regarding the same, but these were stricken, leaving only
the request for an injunction. The court held that as only injunctive relief
was sought, the parties might be joined, quoting 30 Cyc. 1!29.
H. S.

